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Abstract
Why is unprecedented financialization failing to provoke a strong political backlash? 
The role of financial markets, motives, actors, and institutions has expanded continu-
ously in recent decades, but – contrary to Polanyi’s “double movement” theory and 
despite the current financial crisis – market-containment efforts have grown weaker 
over time. The present paper approaches this puzzle by explaining how the practice of 
corporate takeover bids gradually gained political acceptance in the United Kingdom 
from the 1950s onward. Through its expansion, the market for corporate control con-
tributed directly to eroding political resistance by triggering processes of routinization, 
adaptation, and elimination. Routinization decreases issue salience for “average voters” 
because it lowers the news value of takeover bids. Adaptation to new profit opportuni-
ties increases the number of beneficiaries from takeover bids, thereby bolstering pro-
market clienteles. Elimination of stakeholder-oriented companies – through constant 
exposure to takeover threats – demoralizes the opponents of active markets for corpo-
rate control by leaving them with less to fight for. Empirical evidence is drawn mainly 
from qualitative and quantitative analysis of British parliamentary debates regarding 
takeover bids between 1953 and 2011. 
Zusammenfassung
Warum provoziert die historisch beispiellose Finanzialisierung keine starke politische 
Gegenreaktion? Während der Einfluss der Finanzwelt auf  Märkte, Motive, Akteure und 
Institutionen im vergangenen Jahrzehnt kontinuierlich gewachsen ist, sind Bestrebun-
gen zur Markteindämmung schwächer geworden – entgegen Polanyis Theorie der Dop-
pelbewegung und trotz der gegenwärtigen Finanzkrise. Der vorliegende Aufsatz nähert 
sich diesem Rätsel, indem dargelegt wird, wie die Praxis von Übernahmeangeboten 
in Großbritannien seit den 1950er-Jahren allmählich an politischer Akzeptanz gewon-
nen hat. Durch seine Ausdehnung hat der Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle direkt 
zur Erosion politischen Widerstands beigetragen, indem er Prozesse der Routinisierung, 
Anpassung und Eliminierung ausgelöst hat. Routinisierung verringert die Bedeutung 
des Themas für den „Durchschnittswähler“, da sie den Nachrichtenwert von Über-
nahmeangeboten senkt. Anpassung an neue Profitmöglichkeiten erhöht die Zahl der 
Nutznießer von Übernahmeangeboten und stärkt so marktfreundliche Parteien. Elimi-
nierung von stakeholderorientierten Unternehmen durch konstante Übernahmedro-
hungen demoralisiert die Gegner aktiver Märkte für Unternehmenskontrolle, da sich 
Widerstand weniger lohnt. Als empirische Belege werden quantitative und qualitative 
Analysen britischer Parlamentsdebatten zwischen 1953 und 2011 herangezogen.
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Who Cares about Financialization? Explaining the Decline in 
Political Salience of Active Markets for Corporate Control 
The average person … is so offended by the trappings of some bids and mergers 
that he tends to be sickened by the whole process … [Takeover bids are] just about 
the only issues on which the Socialists could win an election these days. 
Harold Wincott, Financial Times, July 7, 1959 
Every week, a bland announcement confirms the sale of another major British 
institution to a foreign predator and, bizarrely, no one is complaining … 
Labour’s somersault is bewildering. The opposition is mute … In previous eras, 
takeover bids provoked furious battles and bitter recrimination.
Tom Bower, The Guardian, February 9, 2007
1 Introduction
Why is unprecedented “financialization”1 failing to provoke a strong political backlash? 
The role of financial markets, motives, actors, and institutions has expanded continu-
ously in recent decades, but – contrary to Polanyi’s “double movement” theory and 
despite the current financial crisis – market-containment efforts have grown weaker 
over time. 
Existing research largely neglects this political dimension. Instead, attention has cen-
tered on economic or socio-cultural aspects of financialization, including its relation-
ship to overall economic performance, the distributional and organizational effects of 
changes in company-internal practices, or the spread of financial concepts, languages, 
and evaluative practices beyond the economic realm. Still scarce are systematic studies 
of how politics mediates these economic, distributional, and socio-cultural changes. 
Culpepper (2011) highlights the low political salience of regulatory changes pertaining 
to corporate control, Crouch (2012) reflects on the “strange death of neo-liberalism” 
following the financial crisis, and Krippner (2011) shows how US policy-makers pro-
moted financialization as a solution to economic challenges that emerged during the 
1970s. However, these path-breaking contributions say little about what determines po-
litical mobilization regarding the turn to finance and how it changes over time. 
To help fill the gap, the present paper explores how the practice of takeover bids, ini-
tially considered intolerable, gradually gained political acceptance in Britain from the 
1950s onward. Takeover bids represent an important step in the process of financializa-
1 Broadly defined, the term denotes the “increasing role of financial motives, markets, actors and 
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein 2005: 3).
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tion because they allow shareholders to exert “arms-length,” market-based control over 
managers. Where they occur, it is common to speak of a market for corporate control. 
Corporate control can and frequently does change hands even in the absence of a liquid 
market, through negotiated mergers or acquisitions. These proceed through a vote by 
the general assembly of shareholders, which is especially convened for the occasion, 
following lengthy negotiations by managers of the companies involved. By contrast, 
takeover bids are public tender offers addressed directly to shareholders.2 They allow 
bidders to bypass managers of the target company and they replace formal coordination 
among shareholders by market-based coordination (cf. Apeldoorn/Horn 2007: 217).
An influential strand of economic theory presents active markets for corporate control 
as an effective means of forcing managers to maximize shareholder value. While the 
simple theory has many caveats (see Cook/Deakin 1999), empirical evidence shows that 
companies in the UK and the United States, where takeover bids are most frequent, 
pay out a higher proportion of their earnings in dividends, and a lower proportion in 
wages, than do companies in countries with less active markets for corporate control. 
According to one study of the 100 largest European corporations, in 1995, labor’s share 
of net value added amounted to just 68 percent in the UK, compared to 88.6 percent in 
Germany (de Jong 1996; see also Pendleton/Gospel 2005).
Given the distributional implications of active markets for corporate control, it is worth 
asking why political resistance to them has declined in many advanced industrialized 
democracies. Takeover regulation was once a central battleground in political struggles 
between the advocates of shareholder- and stakeholder-oriented varieties of capitalism. 
At the European Union level, a directive aimed at facilitating takeover bids encountered 
stiff resistance for thirty years before a watered down version was finally passed in 2003 
(Callaghan/Höpner 2005). At the national level, many European countries – including 
France and Germany – abstained from taking any measures to promote active markets 
for corporate control until well into the 1980s or 1990s (Callaghan 2009). In the UK, 
where takeover bids first emerged in the 1950s, their desirability has been debated in 
the House of Commons on no less than 79 occasions (see below). Historically, govern-
ments intent on curbing takeover bids also passed company laws to strengthen manage-
rial defenses against hostile bids, constrained bidders’ access to finance, exercised their 
veto rights or used tax incentives to render takeovers less lucrative. In recent years, such 
market-containing measures have gone out of fashion and are demanded less and less, 
even by opposition parties.3
2 Essentially, the bidder offers to buy all shares in the target company at a fixed price above the 
market price, subject to the condition that the number of shares sold to him at that price suffices 
for him to take control of the target company.
3 Foreign takeovers are a partial exception (see Callaghan 2012). 
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Pace Culpepper (2011:8), inherent issue complexity does not satisfactorily explain low 
political attention to the market for corporate control.4 Culpepper suggests that elected 
politicians and the media care mainly about issues that mobilize voters, and that many 
corporate governance issues, including takeover rules, are too boring or too complex for 
voters to care about. As a result, politicians and journalists supposedly have weak incen-
tives to acquire independent expertise and this opens the door to business lobbyists, 
who tell them quietly what to think and what to do. To be fair, what causes low salience 
is not Culpepper’s main concern. Instead, his highly insightful analysis concentrates on 
the consequences of “quiet politics.” To highlight those, he focuses on France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, and Japan between 1997 and 2006. 
The narrow temporal and geographical scope of his study invites the suspicion that lack 
of problem pressure, rather than inherent issue complexity, accounts for the low po-
litical salience of takeover regulation in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan. 
Contested bids are still rare in all four countries. Even in France, where the increase was 
largest, the average number of attempted takeovers since 1990 amounts to less than one 
per year. Moreover, most of the companies involved were in the financial sector, with 
no blue-collar jobs at stake. The vulnerability of French companies may have increased 
because of changes in the structure of corporate ownership which Culpepper describes 
in detail, but until more takeovers actually happen, it seems obvious that the average 
voter will not see a pressing need for their regulation. 
The British case, examined below, offers richer insights regarding the determinants of 
political attention to takeover bids because its market for corporate control is older and 
more active. In Britain, as in the United States, bids became a significant technique of 
corporate acquisition in the 1950s and have remained so ever since. Elsewhere, takeover 
bids emerged later and remain less common, partly due to greater concentration of 
corporate ownership. Nevertheless, examination of the British case holds important 
generalizable lessons because many advanced industrialized countries with historically 
inactive markets for corporate control – including France in the late 1960s, Germany in 
the early 1990s, and Japan in the early 2000s – moved from no bids to some bids at some 
point during the post-war period (Jackson/Miyajima 2008), and emerging economies 
seem to be moving in the same direction (Armour/Jacobs/Milhaupt 2011: 273–280). 
The UK experience shows, first, that media attention – Culpepper’s measure of salience 
– changes over time because of changes in perceived problem pressure due to increasing 
routinization. Media attention is neither constantly low – as inherent issue complexity 
would suggest – nor linearly related to the number of takeover bids. Instead, it has a 
hump-shaped relationship to the number of bids. Media interest initially increases as 
the market for corporate control expands, but it declines again as the market expands 
further. The main mechanism at work is the routinization that results from increas-
4 The following paragraphs draw heavily on my forthcoming review of Culpepper’s stimulating 
book for the British Journal of Industrial Relations.
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ing regulatory sophistication. When takeovers first appear in a country, the regulatory 
framework for their conduct is typically underdeveloped and the resulting scandals are 
of high news value. As the number of bids increases, regulators accumulate experience, 
scandals grow fewer, and media interest declines. Thus, takeover politics can be “quiet 
politics” and tends to calm down over time, but it is not inherently quiet. 
Second, to explain changing political attention, reflected in the varying intensity of par-
liamentary debate, we need to look beyond news coverage to changing interest group 
preferences. While the “average voter” can be mobilized by the media, certain interest 
groups – including the workers, managers, shareholders, and bankers of target compa-
nies – care about takeover bids regardless of media attention. Culpepper focuses on how 
quiet politics helps business groups get their way and also offers suggestions concerning 
why managers want different things in different countries. The British case shows that 
interest group preferences also change over time, as a direct result of market expan-
sion. Two processes are at work. First, adaptation to new profit opportunities increases 
the number of beneficiaries from takeover bids. The market for corporate control thus 
“nurtures” its own pro-market clientele. Second, elimination of stakeholder-oriented 
companies – through constant exposure to takeover threats – demoralizes the oppo-
nents of active markets for corporate control by leaving them with less to fight for. 
Employees of a company that is already owned by footloose investors care less if their 
company is taken over by other investors of the same type. 
By mapping and explaining the declining political salience of a key aspect of financial-
ization, the present paper complements ongoing research on the dynamics of capitalist 
development. Streeck (2009), Sewell (2008), and others have recently revived a classical 
strand of research in political economy by asking why gradual change in contemporary 
capitalism is “not random but patterned, proceeding toward liberalization rather than 
in no or some other direction” (Streeck 2009: 240). While their answers focus on the 
drivers of market expansion, mine examines the political response. It thereby helps to 
explain why unprecedented financialization does not inevitably provoke market-tam-
ing counter-moves. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents quantitative and qualitative data to 
map changes in the salience of, and political opposition to, takeover bids in Britain 
since the 1950s. Section 3 explains the decline in salience and opposition by document-
ing and explaining changes in the preferences of key interest groups. The final section 
relates these findings to recent research on the determinants of “quiet politics” and on 
capitalist development. It concludes with suggestions for further research. 
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2 Measuring political salience 
To measure political salience, the present paper draws mainly on parliamentary debates 
– unlike Culpepper (2011), who relies exclusively on news coverage. Both analytical and 
methodological considerations inform this choice. Analytically, my interest in salience 
differs from Culpepper’s. Documenting weak media attention is central to Culpepper’s 
diagnosis of “quiet politics.” However, to establish who cares politically about finan-
cialization, I want to know whether elected politicians promote market-constraining 
regulation. The frequency and content of relevant parliamentary debates measures this 
more directly. Methodologically, Culpepper’s Lexis Nexis news-item count for the years 
1997 to 2006 is difficult to replicate for the longer time period of interest here. Not all 
relevant British newspapers are electronically available from the 1950s onward, and the 
search masks of those that are differ too much to allow for reliable comparison. More-
over, a simple search for the term “takeover bid” produces too many articles that report 
only on economic details of specific bids without commenting on the desirability of the 
practice. More specific search strings are difficult to devise and still require a close read-
ing of individual news items that is beyond the scope of the present inquiry.
A rough indicator of how news coverage evolved is derived from The Times Digital 
Archive,5 which offers full text coverage of The Times from 1775 through 2006 and 
allows searches by news item category. The results discussed below are based on an ad-
vanced search for all items containing the term “takeover bids” or “take-over bids” in the 
sub-categories “News/News” or “Business/Business and Finance.”
Debates in the British House of Commons between 1953 and 2010, recorded in Han-
sard, were sourced from Millbank Systems6 (for debates prior to 2006) and from the 
website of the UK Parliament7 (for debates from 2006 onward). The complete dataset 
comprises all debates in which the term “takeover bid” or “take-over bid” occurs at least 
once. Within that set of 582 documents, 150 texts feature at least five occurrences of 
the term “takeover” or “take-over” and 21 texts feature at least 30 occurrences. In five of 
them, the search terms occur more than 100 times. The content analysis reported below 
is based on a close reading of these five debates, which took place in 1954, 1959, 1972, 
1987, and 2000, respectively. Figure 2, which maps the distribution of debates over time, 
includes all debates that feature at least five occurrences of the term “takeover” or “take-
over.” Debates featuring less than five occurrences were excluded because the reference 
to takeover bids, if relevant at all, was too fleeting.
Both measures require controlling for the fact that takeover bids, like negotiated merg-
ers and acquisitions, proceed in waves. Figure 1 maps the overall number of takeover 
bids and the number of “hostile” bids – defined as those bids that were initially opposed 
5 See: http://find.galegroup.com/ttda
6 See: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com
7 See: http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard 
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by the target management – from 1969 onward. For earlier years, precise figures are not 
available, but Johnson (1980: 9–10) notes intense takeover activity in 1953 and 1954, 
and again in the late 1950s. Well-documented waves peaked – in terms of numbers – in 
1968, 1971, 1986, and 1999. Of these, the third wave, during the late 1980s, was by far 
the largest in terms of value. At its peak in terms of value in 1989, the average deal value 
(at 1990 prices) was 20 million pounds, that is, ten times larger than in 1968 or 1972 
(Sudarsanam 2003: 24). Bids were more aggressive than before, partly because Big Bang 
deregulation had opened the City of London to American investment banks that had 
brought their takeover expertise (Sudarsanam 2003: 25). The fourth wave, during the 
1990s, was largely fuelled by the privatization and deregulation of many sectors, includ-
ing water, electricity, gas, and telecoms. 
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The evolution of media coverage in The Times indicates that takeover bids became less 
newsworthy over time (see Figure 2). Whereas the number of articles in the “Business 
and Finance” section of the newspaper correlates with the number of bids, the num-
ber of articles in the “News” section clearly declines over time. General news coverage 
peaked in 1959, exceeding subsequent coverage even during the takeover boom periods 
of the late 1960s, early 1970s, late 1980s, and mid-1990s.
The distribution of debates over time shows that political attention to takeover bids, 
while correlating with the number of bids, also declined over time (see Figure 3). Politi-
cal interest in taming the market for corporate control displays the same cyclical prop-
erties as the market itself. This suggests that takeover regulation, although not inherent-
ly too complex, is too abstract to elicit sustained political attention. Parliamentarians, 
like the general public, require tangible reminders of why exactly the financialization 
of corporate control needs to be addressed.8 However, the distribution of debates also 
suggests that salience declined over time, even though the trend is evidently not linear. 
Since 1998, issues related to takeover bids featured on average in less than one debate 
per year, in other words, less than during any comparable stretch of time during the 60-
year history of the phenomenon. 
8 In this context, it would be worth examining what types of bid spark calls for intervention. 
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Thorough analysis of five key debates9 and cursory reading of further debates corrob-
orates the impression of declining salience. Broadly speaking, early debates featured 
strong opposition to active markets for corporate control, including vocal calls for mar-
ket-restraining measures. Over time, opposition grew weaker and moved to the back 
benches. Front-bench Members of Parliament (MPs) became more reluctant to con-
demn contested takeovers and more willing to endorse the removal of barriers to active 
markets for corporate control. 
During the 1950s, deplorable aspects or negative consequences of takeover bids were 
addressed not just by Labour delegates, but also by leading Conservatives. In 1954, R.A. 
Butler, Chancellor of the Exchequer, asserted that “adventure of an antisocial type with 
a view to speculative profit for one’s own personal self without proper regard for the 
company should not only be watched but should be discouraged and action taken wher-
ever possible.”10 Sir Walter Fletcher complained that a takeover bid “puts the directors 
in a difficult position,”11 while John Bennett voiced concerns about asset stripping.12 In 
9 February 11, 1954: HC (House of Commons) debate “Takeover bids“; June 29, 1959: HC debate 
“The Condition of Private Industry”; November 11, 1972: HC debate “Takeovers and Mergers”: 
January 28, 1987: HC debate “The City and Industry”; June 6, 2000: HC debate “Market Abuse.”
10 R.A. Butler, Conservative, Saffron Walden, HC Deb 1954-02-11, c. 1458 (“c.” stands for “col-
umn”).
11 Sir Walter Fletcher, Conservative, Bury and Radcliffe, HC Deb 1954-02-11, c. 1422.
12 John Bennett, Conservative, Reading, North, HC Deb 1954-02-11, c. 1434.
Source: Author’s count based on Hansard (1953–2005, 2006–2010).
Figure 3 Number of Commons debates in which the term “takeover” or “take-over” 
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1959, only two Conservative MPs spoke up against takeovers, but this reluctance was 
due at least partly to strong party discipline in the run-up to the 1959 general election. 
The Financial Times suspected that, on a free vote, the motion condemning hostile bids, 
tabled by the Labour opposition, would have been carried by a majority of two to one.13 
Those Conservatives who defied the whip spoke passionately of “a danger that the in-
dustrialist class is being superseded by the financier-accountant class”14 and condemned 
institutional investors “more interested in an immediate good price for the benefit of 
their policy holders or their pensioners, or whatever they may be, than in the long-term 
future of an industrial venture.”15
In later years, Conservatives complaining about takeovers mainly worried about their 
effects on competition.16 Those who denounced asset stripping or short-termism were 
mostly confronted with opposed bids in their own constituencies at the time of the 
debates.17 Systematic analysis of further debates is likely to reveal a more complicated, 
non-linear pattern of support, reflecting changing economic circumstances and vary-
ing details of the bids in question. However, overall, Conservative attitudes toward ac-
tive markets for corporate control clearly grew more positive over time, starting in the 
late 1950s.
The attitudes of Labour MPs changed later and more abruptly. Protest was still very vo-
cal in 1987. By 2000, it had practically disappeared. The debate in 2000 revolved entirely 
around technical issues of regulation and did not feature fundamental objections to 
an active market for corporate control. Since then, complaints have remained scarce. 
A comparison of takeover-related pronouncements during election campaigns starkly 
illustrates the degree to which Labour Party attitudes have changed. Labour’s 1959 elec-
tion manifesto problematized takeover bids in the opening paragraph.18 Labour’s stance 
changed shortly before Tony Blair’s 1997 election victory. In February 1997, a commis-
sion established by the left-leaning Institute of Public Policy Research pronounced that 
“[t]here should be no new administrative restraints on takeovers.” Since then, Labour 
governments have followed this advice. In June 2000, Stephen Byers, trade and industry 
spokesman, told a conference organized by the Trades Union Congress that reforms 
intended to make companies pay more attention to stakeholders were not on the gov-
13 Financial Times, July 7, 1959, 6.
14 William Shepherd, Conservative, Cheadle, HC Deb 1959-06-29, c. 89.
15 Geoffrey Stevens, Conservative, Portsmouth Langstone, HC Deb 1959-06-29, c. 105.
16 Anthony Grant, Conservative, Harrow Central, HC Deb 1972-11-24, c. 1825; Paul Channon, 
Conservative, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, HC Deb 1987-01-28, c. 373; Michael 
Grylls, Conservative, Surrey-North-West, HC Deb 1987-01-28, c. 399.
17 Janet Fookes, Conservative, Merton and Morden, HC Deb 1972-11-24, c. 1777; Bill Walker, 
Conservative, Tayside North, HC Deb 1987-01-28, c. 421. An exception was Sir Peter Holdern, 
Conservative, Horsham, HC Deb 1987-01-28, c. 384.
18 “The business man with a tax-free expense account, the speculator with tax-free capital gains, 
and the retiring company director with a tax-free redundancy payment due to a take-over bid – 
these people have indeed ‘never had it so good’” (Labour Party 1959).
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ernment’s agenda.19 In May 2001, Tony Blair promised a shake-up of business merger 
law to facilitate takeovers, proud to be “right in the centre of the City of London, one of 
the main financial institutions, launching our business manifesto with the support of 
many successful business people.”20 In the run-up to the 2010 election, in the context 
of a controversial bid for Cadbury, Gordon Brown and Peter Mandelson repeated over 
and over again that governments must not interfere with shareholders’ right to decide.
3 Explaining the decline in salience 
The decline in news coverage is attributable at least partly to routinization. When take-
overs first appeared in the United Kingdom, there was no regulatory framework for 
their conduct and the resulting scandals provoked the anger of a broad and diverse co-
alition that extended beyond those directly affected. By 1959, according to the Financial 
Times, “[t]he average person … [was] so offended by the trappings of some bids and 
mergers that he tend[ed] to be sickened by the whole process.”21 The fact that the early 
bids were typically conducted by unruly entrepreneurs and violated unwritten norms 
of conduct added an element of drama to takeover battles that was appreciated by jour-
nalists: “In the popular press, where take-overs received plentiful attention in the 1950s, 
they were portrayed as swashbuckling duels whose ‘distinctive flavour’ was the regular 
trouncing of the Establishment by buccaneer outsiders” (Roberts 1992: 186). 
Over time, as rules grew increasingly sophisticated, the practice of takeover bids, now 
less risky and less damaging to the bidders’ reputation, spread beyond “buccaneer out-
siders,” scandals grew fewer, and media interest declined. The decline in attention was 
one objective of regulation – “This is our last chance before legislation,” remarked one 
of the practitioners responsible for drawing up the Takeover Code (cited in Johnston 
1980: 41) – and one that seems to have been obtained. In 1971, the Chair of the Take-
over Panel expressed satisfaction that the Panel had been “rather less ‘in the news’ dur-
ing the past year: a welcome circumstance, not, as I think, solely attributable to the fact 
that few major problems have had to be dealt with, but also resulting from a general 
acceptance of the Panel’s activity as part of the normal machinery of the City” (Panel 
on Takeovers and Mergers 1971: 3).
Apart from the increase in regulatory sophistication, increasing callousness or the bore-
dom of those not directly affected by takeovers may also have contributed to the decline 
in news coverage. “By the summer of 1959 The Times was commenting that in recent 
19 Financial Times, June 8, 2000, 8.
20 The Guardian, May 30, 2000, 16.
21 Financial Times, July 7, 1959.
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weeks there had been such a flow of take-over bids that, if the trend continued, bids 
would cease to be news” (Johnston 1980: 18). In 1987, a Labour MP warned of the 
danger that, 
if more and more stories [about criminal activity related to takeover bids] come out … the Brit-
ish public will simply become conditioned to accept them. If that happens, the newsworthiness 
of those stories will subside and the danger is that we will create a climate of acceptability for 
these practices in the City … It will become like Northern Ireland, where, when someone dies, 
the media do not treat it in the same way as they did perhaps 10 years ago.22
However, to explain declining political attention and opposition, as reflected in the de-
clining intensity of parliamentary debate, we need to look beyond news coverage to 
interest group preferences. While the “average voter” can be mobilized by the media, 
certain interest groups – including the workers, managers, shareholders, and bankers of 
target companies – care about takeover bids regardless of media attention. Like Culpep-
per (2011), I assume that, where media attention is low, politicians cater mainly to these 
groups. Accordingly, the remainder of this section documents and explains changes in 
interest group preferences to help explain the decline in salience. 
Two processes triggered by the expanding market for corporate control contributed to 
changing interest group preferences. The first, adaptation, took various forms, includ-
ing conversion, compensation, and co-evolution. Adaptation through conversion best 
describes the changing attitudes of British merchant banks. Today’s merchant banks un-
ambiguously benefit from Britain’s active market for corporate control, but in the 1950s 
they had not yet positioned themselves in that way. Established houses had good reason 
to fear that involvement with hostile bids would elicit punishment by other members of 
what, at the time, was still a tight, club-like, business network. In 1953, the Governor of 
the Bank of England “sent a letter to the banking and insurance industry associations 
reminding them that … the authorities regarded the finance of take-overs as specula-
tion and wished it to stop, a classic example of the Bank of England exercising informal 
regulatory control over the City of London” (Roberts 1992: 189). When, in 1959, the 
merchant banks Warburgs, Hellberg, Waggs, and Schroders violated unwritten rules by 
financing a hostile bid for British Aluminium, the banks advising the target company, 
Lazards and Hambros, were outraged and appalled … a feeling which was widespread in the 
City. On New Year’s Eve it was revealed that a “City Consortium,” comprising 14 of the most 
respected names in the Square Mile including the merchant banks Morgan Grenfell, Samuel 
Montagu, M. Samuel, Brown Shipley and Guinness Mahon and the leading brokers Cazenove 
and Rowe & Pitman, had been assembled to contest the issue. (Roberts 1992: 192)
The merchant banks adapted rapidly after the government and the Bank of England 
refrained from intervening to prevent the hostile bid. According to Roberts (1992: 193) 
“the humiliation of the City Consortium changed City attitudes to take-overs overnight 
22 Dale Campbell-Savours, Labour, Workington, HC Deb 1987-01-28, c. 395.
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and henceforth financial advisers added hostile bids to their repertoire of merger and 
acquisition techniques.” The main mechanism at work was conversion – or what Cul-
pepper (2005) calls a “joint belief shift” – but numeric expansion also took place. Slater 
Walker, founded in 1964, is only one prominent example of a new banking establish-
ment specializing in takeover finance. After “Big Bang” deregulation in the 1980s, Lon-
don’s lucrative investment banking business also attracted many entrants from abroad. 
Adaptation through compensation best describes the changing attitudes of managers, 
although adaptation through conversion also played a role. According to Armour and 
Skeel (2007: 1772, 1775), “the first wave of hostile takeovers in the early 1950s provoked 
public hostility from corporate managers and trade unions,” who denounced individu-
als like Clore and Samuel as “speculators” intent on the “predatory dismembering” of 
British businesses solely to “tak[e] out as much cash as possible in the shortest time.” 
Managers felt within their rights to defend themselves by whatever means they pleased 
and frequently did so (see Johnston 1980). “[By 1969], management opposition to the 
idea of hostile takeovers had waned dramatically” (Armour/Skeel 2007: 1775).
Adaptation through conversion changed the attitudes of some managers, but the result-
ing divisions within the managerial community did not quell all protest, although they 
weakened the capacity of managerial associations to speak with one voice. “[S]tarting 
in the 1960s, bids were driven by consolidation, and managers were just as likely to be 
bidders as targets in this milieu” (Armour/Skeel 2007: 1775). For a brief period during 
the 1960s, new accounting rules also raised hopes that bids motivated by asset stripping 
had become less feasible (Johnston 1980: 58). However, when these hopes were dashed 
during the takeover boom of the 1980s, discontent flared up again. The CBI conference 
in November 1986 split down the middle over a resolution stating that “[g]overnment 
and financial institutions in particular must recognize that if manufacturing industry is 
to survive, a long-term view must be taken in terms of financial returns, rather than the 
short-term view forced by them on British managers.”23 That same winter, the Institute 
of Directors conducted a survey of 200 senior company directors in which almost 40 
percent of respondents described the relationship between manufacturing and industry, 
on one side, and the city and the financial sector, on the other, as unsatisfactory or very 
unsatisfactory.24 Similarly, a 1988 CBI survey of 250 companies in the manufacturing 
and service sectors showed that 64 percent of respondents did not think that financial 
institutions were taking a long-term and strategic evaluation of their company.25 As in 
the previous year, City short-termism featured prominently at the 1988 CBI conference. 
A resolution declaring that “[t]his conference is concerned that the national attitude 
towards investment appears to place greater emphasis on the values of the City rather 
than those of manufacturing industry” ended in a tied vote.26 
23 The Times, November 12, 1986.
24 Financial Times, December 29, 1986, 3.
25 Financial Times, November 4, 1988.
26 Financial Times, November 8, 1988.
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Adaptation through compensation may help to explain why, since the late 1980s, divi-
sions within the CBI have all but disappeared. “Golden handshakes” or “golden para-
chutes” that guarantee generous compensation in the event of job loss due to a takeover 
effectively insulate managers from the disciplinary pressures of the market for corpo-
rate control. They could thus be interpreted as a bribe that buys managerial acquies-
cence. As Boyer (2005: 21) puts it, “beneath the tyranny of investors, an implicit alliance 
between managers and investors takes place.” Systematic historical data on severance 
pay arrangements are not available and golden handshakes are too old an invention to 
fully account for the abrupt change in managerial attitudes since the 1980s. As early as 
1954, Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell complained that “the directors of the original com-
panies are in a position to bargain so as to take care of their own position … as a rule, 
the crucial point in such negotiations … is whether directors threatened with displace-
ment feel that they will be adequately looked after.”27 The first use of the term “golden 
handshake” in a Commons debate dates back to 1959.28 Between 1959 and 1989 it was 
used regularly in takeover-related debates, appearing 59 times in 22 debates. (Strange-
ly, there are no further mentions after 1989.) However, there is reason to suspect that 
golden handshakes became more widespread in response to the takeover boom of the 
1980s – a period that also saw dramatic change in other dimensions of British executive 
pay (see Conyon/Schwalbach 2000: 507).29 During the early 1990s, they were definitely 
widely used. According to a 1993 Incomes Data Survey, “the typical severance arrange-
ment for a senior executive with a three-year rolling contract was two years’ pay plus 
compensation for the loss of any expected bonus” (Thompson 2005: 22, footnote 4). La-
bour Research reported that, in 1992, “48 directors of UK listed companies had received 
severance pay in excess of £100,000 … Eleven of these directors had pay offs exceeding 
£500,000” (Conyon 1994: 26). From the early 1990s onward, a backlash against excessive 
severance payments has led to their partial curtailment (Thompson 2005: 22–23), but 
compensation still takes place.
Adaptation through co-evolution best describes growing support from institutional in-
vestors. Institutional investors did not need to be converted or compensated because 
their emergence and proliferation is directly attributable to the emergence and expan-
sion of the market for corporate control. Today’s institutional investors are vocal advo-
cates and major beneficiaries of Britain’s active market for corporate control. Moreover, 
the size of Britain’s financial sector nowadays makes it difficult not just for Conser-
vatives, but also for Labour, to ignore investors’ demands. In 2007, financial services 
accounted for 4 percent of total UK employment, 15 percent of income tax and 26.5 
percent of corporation tax (Morgan 2012: 379). However, matters were different in the 
1950s. While financial domination of the British economy goes back much further, in-
stitutional investors emerged and grew alongside the market for corporate control. 
27 Hugh Gaitskell (Labour), HC Deb 1954-02-11, c. 1443.
28 Harold Wilson (Labour), HC Deb 1959-06-29, c. 41.
29 Stock option usage became popular after 1984 and the gap between top pay and manufacturing 
operatives doubled in the period from 1984 to 1996.
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Among institutional investors, pension funds and insurance companies were the dominant 
players, with the percentage of shares owned by pension funds growing from 1 percent in 1957 
to 17 percent in 1975 and 31 percent in 1991 and the equivalent figures for insurance companies 
being 8 percent (1957), 16 percent (1975) and 20 percent (1991). (Cheffins/Bank 2007: 802) 
The numeric increase in institutional investors was caused in part by the same tax rules 
that drove large blockholders to divest their stakes and thereby rendered takeover bids 
attractive during the 1950s (Cheffins/Bank 2007). They continued to prosper in Brit-
ain’s active and increasingly well-regulated market for corporate control at least partly 
because, as minority shareholders, they benefited from the strong minority shareholder 
protections enforced by the Takeover Panel. 
While the expanding market for corporate control thus nurtured pro-market political 
clienteles by triggering an expansion in the number of beneficiaries from takeover bids, 
the number of victims was not thereby significantly reduced. Except for managers, who 
may have been won over by compensatory side-payments, the non-shareholder stake-
holders of target companies suffer no less from exposure to takeover threats today than 
they did 50 years ago. 
Nevertheless, market expansion also contributed to weakening protests by triggering 
a process of elimination, not of the victims themselves, but of their strongholds, as it 
were. To the extent that takeover threats force companies to prioritize shareholder val-
ue, expanding markets for corporate control gradually eliminate stakeholder-oriented 
companies and this demoralizes opponents by leaving them with less to fight for. Dur-
ing the early 1950s, before shareholder value pressures took their toll, there were many 
stakeholder-oriented companies worth defending against the challenges of takeover 
bids. In the 1954 debate, Roy Jenkins explained his party’s opposition to takeover bids 
by noting that 
a sort of de facto situation has grown up recently in which it has been accepted that at least the 
very big public companies exist for a great number of reasons other than that of making profits 
for their shareholders. The importance of the whole take-over bid situation is that it is a direct 
challenge to that understanding.30
In the same vein, his party colleague John Strachey remarked that 
[t]he great companies of this country have at least partly realized that they are no longer simply 
profit-spinning organizations, that they are no longer simply organizations which have one 
duty and one duty alone – to maximize the distribution of profits to their shareholders.31
30 Roy Jenkins in HC Deb 1954-02-11, c.1393.
31 John Strachey, Labour, HC Deb 1954-02-11, c. 1420; compare also Eric Fletcher, Labour, HC 
Deb 1954-02-11, c. 1430.
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The complaint that takeover bids hit “virtuous” companies appears frequently in early 
debates but has been used less in recent times. A rare exception is the 2010 takeover 
of Cadbury, which had a Labour backbencher protesting that “this is a company with 
a sense of belief and commitment to its own community. It is a model company. The 
sense of anger and betrayal in the area about what has happened cannot be underesti-
mated and we want a response that is appropriate to that.”32
The declining frequency of such protests can be attributed at least partly to the fact that, 
during 60 years of exposure to takeover threats, the number of stakeholder-oriented 
companies deemed worth defending has inevitably declined. The case of Pilkington, 
a sheet glass manufacturer based in Lancashire, illustrates the point. Pilkington was 
subject to takeover bids in both 1985 and in 2005. The first bid, by the British-based 
conglomerate BRT, sparked massive protest, while the second, by NSG, a Japanese com-
petitor, proceeded far more quietly. Asked for an explanation, David Watts, the Labour 
MP for St Helens North, remarked that, nowadays, “large companies like Pilkington are 
mainly controlled by London-based investors anyway and therefore the local link isn’t 
as strong as it might have been in the past.” 33
4 Conclusion 
The present paper shows that and suggests why the practice of takeover bids, initially 
considered outrageous, gradually gained political acceptance in Britain from the 1950s. 
I argue that the very process of market expansion contributed to eroding political re-
sistance by triggering processes of routinization, adaptation, and elimination. Routi-
nization decreases issue salience for the average voter because it lowers the news value 
of takeover bids. Adaptation to new profit opportunities increases the number of ben-
eficiaries from takeover bids, thereby bolstering pro-market clienteles. Elimination of 
stakeholder-oriented companies – through constant exposure to takeover threats – de-
moralizes the opponents of active markets for corporate control by leaving them with 
less to fight for. 
Why, then, did the opponents of takeover bids not prevent market expansion during the 
1950s, before it triggered routinization, adaptation, and elimination? Quite possibly be-
cause, even at their strongest and most numerous, they never stood a chance. Or maybe 
they would have if Labour had returned to government before it was too late. (The 
reasons for Labour’s 1959 election defeat are manifold, but vocal condemnation of the 
market for corporate control was not among them – at least according to the Financial 
Times, which considered it a vote-winning stance; see the quote on p. 1).
32 Tony Wright, Labour, Cannock Chase, HC Deb 2010-01-26, c. 787.
33 Daily Post (Liverpool), November 16, 2005, 8 and 9.
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A definite answer may not be possible and is certainly beyond the scope of the present 
enquiry, which confines itself to explaining why the window of opportunity for politi-
cal resistance to financialization may narrow, rather than widen, over time. Apart from 
the interest-transforming processes discussed above, ideational developments clearly 
also play a role and there may be countervailing factors that I have overlooked. Rather 
than provide a complete and parsimonious causal explanation, the present paper draws 
attention to what market expansion itself contributes to the gradual erosion of political 
resistance.
By documenting the decline in both salience and opposition, the paper advances recent 
research on the determinants of “quiet politics” (see Culpepper 2011). Qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of British parliamentary debates and news coverage from the 1950s 
onward shows that inherent issue complexity does not adequately explain why recent 
takeover politics has been quiet rather than loud. In the UK, as elsewhere, for the past 
two decades political parties have largely refrained from questioning the desirability of 
an active market for corporate control. However, the heated debates of earlier periods 
show that the issue can, in principle, provoke broad political mobilization. The argu-
ment that expanding markets gradually erode resistance to them suggests that “salience 
curves” may be hump-shaped. At low levels of financialization (here: low numbers of 
takeover bids) salience is low due to low problem pressure and thus presumably low 
salience. As problem pressure mounts, salience increases, at least initially. As problem 
pressure mounts even further, actors begin to adjust and salience declines. Politically, 
this implies that the window of opportunity for broad political mobilization against 
takeovers and other instances of financialization is not perpetually locked, but that it 
narrows over time. 
By exploring the determinants of political salience, the paper also complements recent 
research on the dynamics of capitalist development. Static cross-country comparison 
in the “Varieties of Capitalism” tradition still dominates contemporary research in po-
litical economy, but earlier work on changes within capitalist systems of production is 
attracting renewed attention. With its emphasis on under-socialized opportunists as 
drivers of institutional innovation, Streeck’s (2009) recent influential account advances 
a venerable tradition of scholarship.34 However, to fully understand the dynamics of 
capitalist development, we need to understand not just how the market for corporate 
control emerged, but also why elected politicians tolerate and increasingly promote its 
34 Tensions between entrepreneurial outsiders and guardians of the status quo, “summarized by 
Pareto (1980) as the conflict between foxes and lions, and by Veblen (1934) in his depiction of 
predatory, industrious hunters conquering diligent farmers and ranchers, also underlies Mer-
ton’s (1972) analysis of entrepreneurial innovators, Smith’s ([1776]1937) model of competition, 
Marx’s contention that capitalists will thereby devour each other (Marx and Engels 1978) and 
contrasts by Chandler (1962, 1977) and Schumpeter (1954) of entrepreneurs and administra-
tors” (Hirsch 1986: 804). 
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survival and territorial spread. The processes outlined above help explain why unprec-
edented market expansion regularly fails to provoke a re-regulatory, market-taming re-
sponse.
Beyond that, the paper aims to stimulate further research, much of which remains to be 
done. Among other tasks, the evolution of political attitudes needs to be mapped more 
precisely through systematic coding of further debates. Cursory reading suggests that 
the decline in resistance was not linear but proceeded in fits and starts. The great ma-
jority of takeovers never attracted much political attention and among those that did, 
the intensity of the reaction always varied across targets. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that brand name familiarity is no less important than the economic significance of the 
target company. In the UK, takeover battles involving breweries,35 tobacco companies,36 
chocolate makers,37 and car manufacturers38 drew strong media attention. In France, a 
rumored bid for food maker Danone inspired new anti-takeover legislation, while, al-
most simultaneously, the actual takeover of Euronext, a pan-European stock exchange 
headquartered in Paris, received scant political attention (Callaghan/Lagneau-Ymonet 
2012). Identifying factors that spark debate would contribute to research on the political 
salience of corporate governance issues that was recently initiated by Culpepper (2011).
Extending the analysis to other countries would also be worthwhile. In France, takeover 
bids did not become a political issue until the 1980s. In Germany, they were practically 
unknown until the 1990s. Since then, a market for corporate control has developed in 
both countries, even though the number of bids is still modest by comparison to the UK 
and the United States (see Jackson/Miyajima 2008; Höpner/Jackson 2006). The time lag 
significantly affected the dynamics of market development. In the UK, as shown above, 
the market for corporate control emerged spontaneously after the structural prerequi-
sites – widely dispersed corporate ownership, the possibility to detect undervalued com-
panies, and incentives to acquire them – had come about more or less unplanned. In 
Germany and France, interested actors deliberately tried to create these conditions with 
the express aim to emulate the British example. EU legislation served as an important 
vehicle for these efforts. Exploration of the political dynamics in these countries would 
bring us another step closer to understanding the decline in salience of financialization. 
35 For example, Sears/Watney Mann (1959), Guinness/Arthur Bells (1985), Elders XL/Allied Lyons 
(1985).
36 For example, Gallaher/American Tobacco (1968).
37 For example, Nestlé/Rowntree (1989), Kraft/Cadbury (2010).
38 For example, Honda/Rover (1985).
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